I. INTRODUCTION
I n the area of local government finance, debt financing is a powerful tool. Increasing debt is a way, at least in the short run, for a community to have goods and services today and pay for them tomorrow. 1 Debt allows the costs of public services to be spread out over time according to the debt issue repayment schedule. Debt financing allows communities to have increased flexibility with their current budgets and spending while promising to repay the principal plus interest in the future. It is, however, costly to increase debt, especially if doing so leads to a rise in the municipality's default risk. 2 In addition, some communities require voter approval for all debt issues, which can also add to the cost of debt financing.
Unfunded pension liabilities, a form of implicit debt financing, allow for delayed payments owed to the public workforce and are computed as the difference between actuarial accrued liabilities and the actuarial valuation of assets of the public pension. Although pension obligations correspond directly to labor costs, delaying these payments allows for the transfer of current cash to fund other public goods and services (Inman, 1982) . Unfunded pension liabilities can help municipalities maintain current budgetary solvency and allow for consumption smoothing of public goods by permitting small levels of deficits to persist. Public pensions with stock or funded ratios (the actuarial valuation of assets divided by actuarial accrued liabilities) above 80 percent are commonly considered to be financially sound (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008) . Underfunding pensions has become a popular strategy to fund governments and is a growing problem especially in light of increased investment return losses in recent years (Yang and Mitchell, 2008) .
Until recently, there has been little emphasis on the disclosure of these liabilities by municipalities. 3 Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) estimate unfunded liabilities of state employee pensions within the U.S. to be more than $1 trillion. Unlike raising taxes or incurring debt to fund government, unfunded pension liabilities often increase without direct voter approval. State pension funding has been shown to be negatively affected by state fiscal stress and the existence of balanced budget requirements (Chaney, Copley, and Stone, 2002) . Rauh (2011, p . 1) describes unfunded pension liabilities as "the largest loophole in balanced budget pledges. When politicians have spent money without raising taxes, pensions have proven the perfect borrowing vehicle."
A broad literature explores the link between local tax/service packages on home prices. 4 However, only a few of the existing empirical studies consider the impact of unfunded pension liabilities. For the United States, Epple and Schipper (1981) and Leeds (1985) find conflicting results for unfunded pension liabilities, with the former estimating a negative impact and the latter finding no impact, suggesting pension liabilities could be a form of hidden taxation. Neither of these studies controls for individual housing characteristics or local amenities and neither addresses variation in actuarial assumptions of the multiple pensions covered within the analyses. For Switzerland, Stadelmann and Eichenberger (2013) have the institutional advantage of uniform public accounting and are able to estimate the capitalization of net public debts in specifications that control for community fixed effects. In their case, however, there is no implicit debt since health and retirement plans are fully funded.
In this paper, I measure the house price capitalization of negative information or "news" about local public debt levels and their underlying impact on the provision of public goods and services. In early 2004, the San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (SDCERS) suddenly became local and national news due to the revelation that the "City and SDCERS provided public disclosures about pension obligations … that were incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading from 1996 through 2003" (Levitt, Turner and Dahlberg, 2006) . Furthermore, unfunded pension liabilities increased over this period from $284 million (an 89.9 percent funded ratio) in June 2001 to $1.157 billion (a 67.2 percent funded ratio) in June 2003 (Levitt, Turner and Dahlberg, 2006; Navigant Consulting, 2006; City of San Diego Pension Reform Committee, 2004) . Starting in February 2004 the credit rating agencies began a series of downgrades for San Diego City municipal bonds. I take this event as the point in time indicating a drop in the discounted present value of expected net service benefits for San Diego City residents and prospective residents. 5 The size and timing of San Diego City's pension crisis and the severity of its financial problems make this an interesting and relevant case study for an increasing number of local governments struggling financially, many due to the rising cost of employee retirement systems. Despite the city's best efforts, unfunded pension liabilities (excluding retiree health care costs) grew to $2.7 billion by 2008 or a magnitude equal to the city's entire annual budget (Hall, 2008) . The surprise revelation of San Diego City's unfunded pension liabilities served as a shock to residents' expectations regarding their expected level of public goods provision and taxes. It provides a natural experiment identifying the relationship between housing prices and updated expectations about the city's financial condition. In this paper, I measure how this negative news has been capitalized into local housing market prices, where the neighboring communities serve as the control group. 6 In modeling the change of housing prices over time, I use a boundary discontinuity design to compare prices of home sales within shared "neighborhoods" and on opposite sides of the San Diego City border. Using housing and sales data from the San Diego County Assessor and Recorder for the years 1996-2007, I partition the San Diego City border into small geographic areas with home sales on both sides of the border. A large share of the change in net benefits within San Diego City is likely to be borne by its residents, given the methods of taxation available to local governments and the services 5 Zodrow (2006) residents expect from their local governments. The model compares the response in housing prices within these paired treatment and control groups by including fixed effects to account for neighborhood heterogeneity. I find that the "news announcement" of significant consequences from the city's current and growing levels of unfunded pension liabilities led to a 2.5-3.7 percent decrease in San Diego City housing sales prices over the four years following the announcement. The contribution of this study to the existing literature is that it provides evidence that local public debt -in the form of unfunded pension liabilities -reduces property values. The public revelation that rising levels of unfunded pension liabilities were greater than had been previously indicated or understood to be provides the exogenous shock for a natural experiment. This adverse information about the city's financial position and pension reveals previously unrecognized debt to be paid by residents in the future Source: Data are computed using the Four-Quarter Percent Change in Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) MSA-Level House Price Indexes. The FHFA divides the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana MSA into the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale and Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine Metropolitan Divisions. The FHFA data are available at http://www.fhfa.gov/. 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Years San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario through reduced services and/or higher taxes. Using a boundary discontinuity design, the relative housing price changes are compared for treatment and control groups before and after the "news" event. Home values in San Diego City were negatively impacted and the impact was greater than the actual debt burden for residents. In the following section, I provide an event background of the San Diego City pension crisis. In Section III, I describe the empirical model, data, and methods used in the analysis. I present estimation results and additional robustness tests in Sections IV and V. In Section VI, I provide some concluding thoughts.
II. EVENT BACKGROUND
The timing of the important events surrounding the San Diego City pension crisis is well documented (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie, 2011; Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie, 2010; Denison and Burke, 2008; Levitt, Turner and Dahlberg, 2006; Navigant Consulting, 2006; City of San Diego Pension Reform Committee, 2004) . Prior to 1996, the 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
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Annual Percent Change in FHFA MSA-Level Housing Price Indexes city did not allow underfunding of its pension and the city's finances were in seemingly good shape. However, in an effort to allow for increased spending on large investments (e.g., hosting the Republican National Convention in 1996 and construction of Petco Park from 2000 to 2004) and flexibility within the city budget, San Diego City changed its pension policy to allow for underfunding in 1996.
In 2001, unfunded pension liabilities rose drastically when pension investment revenues fell due to the recession. Subsequently, unfunded pension liabilities continued to rise because the city could not afford to pay the pension's annual required contributions. The pension policy required that if the funded ratio fell below the trigger ratio of 82.3 percent, the city would be forced to make a restoration payment. To avoid this large payment, in 2002 the trigger ratio was lowered to 67 percent. In order for city labor unions to agree to the change, benefit enhancements were included. 7 Between 2002 and 2004, the city's unfunded pension liabilities continued to grow. In February 2002, a committee formed to evaluate San Diego City finances declared the city finances to be sound, with the caveat that the pension plan might require further inspection. This was a potentially misleading and false conclusion because the courts typically uphold the obligation to pay public pension liabilities, and thus a city's financial condition should always incorporate the pension. In September 2003, the San Diego City Council created a Pension Reform Committee. In December 2003, SDCERS's newly released Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) for the 2003 fiscal year indicated the funded ratio eighteen months prior was only 77.3 percent and, for the first time, below the 80 percent threshold for financially sound pensions.
In late 2003, San Diego City was in the process of issuing a sewer revenue bond. At this time a pension board member is credited with "blowing the whistle" by revealing that San Diego City had failed to disclose material information in its financial reports, including the current level of unfunded pension liabilities and accounting errors that masked negative aspects of the city's financial condition (LaVelle, 2004a) . By February 2004, the city confirmed the reporting errors and announced that the previously unstated current level of unfunded pension liabilities was over $1 billion, or one third of the city's annual budget. In addition, retiree healthcare costs at this time were also estimated to be about $1 billion. Immediately following this revelation, San Diego 7 These benefit enhancements included: cost of living adjustments (COLA), the elimination of the existing requirement to offset disability income, the purchasing of service credit was made available to half-time and three-quarter-time employees, a calculation increase for the 13 th Check that gives retirees an extra payment, increased benefits to general members and other special member groups, and the Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) allowing for beneficiaries to collect benefits during their last five years of employment. Many of these corresponding benefit enhancements and the reduced employer contributions made available by these policy changes were intended to be paid for by the surplus of undistributed earnings of the pension investment funds. This, however, is at odds with the actuarial assumptions and the required rate of return on investments in order to fund the pension, where above average returns compensate for the below average returns over time. Starting in 1996, SDCERS also assumed responsibility from the city to manage the retiree health insurance which is a pay-as-you-go benefit made available until the death of the retiree and their spouse.
City's credit rating was downgraded and subsequent downgrades occurred throughout the year until Standard & Poor's suspended their rating altogether. 8 On September 7, 2004, The New York Times published an article that aptly referred to San Diego's financial situation as "Enron-by-the-Sea" and stated "the city was forced to admit that it had misstated its financial condition for the last several years, and it has not yet produced a certified financial statement for 2003" (Broder, 2004) . The actuarial valuation of assets, accrued liabilities, and membership payroll for the pension plan from 1993-2007 are shown in Figure 3 . 9 Vertical lines denote the 1996 pension policy change allowing for underfunding, the 2002 policy change that increased underfunding, and the announcement of the pension crisis in 2004. A direct result of the announcement of San Diego City's public pension crisis was an immediate change in the public's expectations that the city would require increased net revenues in order to pay for unfunded pension liabilities. Regardless of whether the city would decide to increase future net revenues through increased taxes and/or reduced services, or through reduced payments to municipal employees, the prospect of residing within San Diego City relative to surrounding communities became less desirable following the announcement of the pension crisis. 10 How much less desirable 8 According to The San Diego Union-Tribune, Moody's Investor Service lowered the city's outlook from "stable" to "negative" on February 2, 2004 due to the underfunding of the public pension fund and the recent disclosure of the city's accounting errors (LaVelle, 2004a (LaVelle, 2004d and Hall, 2004b) . Fitch downgraded city bonds by two and three notches in February 2005 (Hall, 2005) . Moody's downgraded city's credit rating again in August 2005 (LaVelle, 2005) . According to Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie (2011) , the Standard & Poor's ratings suspension effectively shut the city out of the municipal bond market until the credit rating was restored in May 2008. 9 In 2006, the city issued tobacco revenue-backed bonds from the Master Settlement Agreement with major producers of tobacco. This allowed the city to make an extra payment of $105.4 million to the pension in that year. The impact of this payment is reflected in the trend of pension assets in Figure 3 and in the trend of unfunded pension liabilities in Figure 4 . 10 Two unlikely alternatives for raising municipalities' net revenues include municipal bankruptcy and changing municipal boundaries. Skeel (2013) argues that municipal bankruptcy can be used to restructure collective bargaining agreements, terms of debt, and unfunded pension liabilities. Unfunded pension liabilities are said to have similar legal claims as unsecured debt issues. The judge presiding over the recent bankruptcy filing of Detroit, Michigan recently ruled that the public pension obligations should be treated similarly as other contracts in bankruptcy. Previously, the 2008 bankruptcy filing of Vallejo, California left large pension obligations untouched. Boundary changes, as a method of raising revenue, do not seem to be applicable in this study, largely because of California's Proposition 13 and the state's control of the flow of property tax revenues to municipalities and county governments. Any land annexation or detachment between municipalities would need to be negotiated with a money transfer. The San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) explained except for minor land swaps, municipal borders within San Diego County have been unchanged for the past thirty years. This is consistent with Epple and Romer (1989) who argue against the flexible-boundaries hypothesis.
depends on the extent to which the city might export the payment of unfunded pension liabilities to nonresidents, which depends on the services or taxes that are adjusted. Local government uses of the various revenue and expenditure categories are largely defined and constrained legally. Table 1 provides 5 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Years Actuarial Valuation of Assets Accrued Actuarial Liabilities
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have any potential to pay for unfunded pension liabilities. 12 For many of the revenue sources, an increase would require voter approval. Property taxes are capped at one percent of property values by California's Proposition 13. Other legal restrictions apply to the use of revenues from sales and gross receipts taxes, other taxes, miscellaneous general revenue, and general charges. The prospect of raising taxes is further limited by the ability of San Diego City's residents to avoid taxes by conducting business in neighboring communities. Another alternative to pay for unfunded pension liabilities is to cut services. Of these expenditure categories, only 67 percent of total expenditures are from categories that might be reduced to potentially help pay for pension obligations. 13 Following the pension crisis in 2004 through 2006, there have been substantial decreases in spending on transportation and on environment/housing. These decreases are of the magnitude of 45 percent and 21 percent, respectively. 14 Public safety and social services spending rose slightly during these years. Since 2006, however, San Diego City has pledged to reduce spending on fire safety, police staffing, library services, and parks and recreation in an effort to improve city finances. Following the 2001 recession, total revenues and total expenditures for San Diego City followed trends consistent with a city in financial distress (Figure 4) 
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financial condition through increased net revenues, had become a relatively less desirable place to live with respect to the provision of public goods.
III. HOUSING DATA, MODEL, AND METHODS
This section focuses on the San Diego housing market response to news of the pension crisis and the city's financial problems. I employ the hedonic pricing model developed in the literature (Rosen, 1974; Sheppard, 1999) to explain the variations in sales prices of individual homes. The dependent variable in this study is the natural log of the sales price for individual single family residences in San Diego County. This model allows for implicit valuations of housing characteristics, neighborhood locations, and when the home was purchased. The negative news of increased unfunded pension liabilities is expected to have a negative effect on home values within the city. The impact of the news is measured as the percentage change in the average sales price for homes in San Diego City, relative to homes just outside its boundaries, following the announcement of the pension crisis and the initial downgrading of the city's credit ratings.
A. Data
This study employs sales and housing characteristics data for single family residences in San Diego County from 1996 to 2007. 15 Data for sales and the physical characteristics for each housing unit come from merging data from the San Diego County Assessor/ Recorder and CD-DATA. 16 These data are then merged with the parcel map data from SANDAG GIS (in conjunction with the San Diego County Assessor) to determine single family residence status, lot size, and acreage. 17 Using the maps from SANDAG, I identify housing sales on both sides of the San Diego City border and within 0.25 miles of the border. 18 There are 22,195 housing sales 15 Home sales are restricted to before 2008 to avoid the housing financial crisis and the influx of home defaults. 16 The San Diego County Assessor/Recorder data were missing sales from three quarters of 2004 and CD-DATA (ParcelQuest, http://www.parcelquest.com/) provided historical public files where data include sales information for the three most recent sales of each property. Housing characteristics were drawn from both sources. The merged data provide one complete dataset. 17 There are limitations to the data. The most significant limitation is that the housing characteristics in the data reflect the housing unit at the time of its most recent sale or appraisal. Where improvements are made to a home that was sold multiple times, the housing characteristics may be incorrect for the earlier sales. This data limitation occurs because the data are maintained by the San Diego County Assessor's Office whose purpose is ensuring the proper property tax liabilities are being applied to each parcel. observations (representing about 3.6 percent of single family residence sales in San Diego County according to the data) within 0.25 miles of the San Diego City border included in the border partitions -13,759 within San Diego City and 8,436 outside the city. GIS mapping software was used to group the home sales along the city border into small geographical areas according to border partitions, where each partition includes home sales from both sides of the border. There are 51 to 56 partitions resulting from the natural geography along the border, the location of nonresidential properties (e.g., Marine Corps Air Station Miramar), and the chosen methodology which favors small partitions or shared "neighborhoods" for comparison groups. The average number of parcels within these border partitions is 398 parcels, with 239 located within San Diego City and 159 outside the city. The average border partition area is 1.6 square miles. The average maximum distance between any two parcels within the same border partition is 1.6 miles.
There is also a hierarchal organization imposed on the data where the border partitions are grouped by region. The regions include north, northeast, south, southeast, and the disjoint San Diego City region along the U.S./Mexico International Border. Table  2 shows the number of home sales within each of the five regions.
Descriptive statistics for the housing data are presented in Table 3 . The overall mean and median prices across all 22,195 observations within 0.25 miles of the San Diego City border are $403,943 and $326,112, respectively. The characteristics of homes within and outside San Diego City can vary. Homes outside San Diego City are relatively more expensive, have more acreage, and are more likely to have a pool. 19 These general relationships appear to hold whether the data represent homes within 0.25 or 1 mile of the city border.
The differences between the treatment and control group and within these groups along the San Diego City border are not surprising because properties are subject to potentially unique zoning requirements. These zoning requirements can vary both between and within cities. Housing characteristics tend to be more similar when crossborder comparisons are limited to control observations consisting of homes located in municipalities instead of unincorporated areas. For the former group comparison, homes sold within San Diego City are about five years newer on average and have acreage of about 0.20 compared to an average of 0.35 for the "municipalities" control group. The 19 In order to assess whether the home sales on the opposite side of the San Diego City border constitutes an adequate control group for the treatment group, I regressed the covariates of the study's main regression models on the San Diego City dummy, quarterly dummy variables, and the border partitions. If the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar for those covariates, the San Diego City dummy should be insignificant. According to the data, these coefficients for each of the covariate regressions are insignificant except for acreage and whether the home has a pool. For these variables, a parcel with greater acreage and/or having a pool would suggest the parcel is more likely to be located outside the San Diego City limits. The differences in land acreage and/or pools between San Diego City (a community which is older, larger, and generally more densely populated) and surrounding municipalities or unincorporated areas likely results from zoning differences, the history of these settlements, community preferences, and land availability. treatment and control group both have an average home size of 1,800 square feet. For the latter group comparison, homes in both the treatment and control areas tend to be about 0.50 acres, however, the average home size within San Diego City is about 1,900 square feet compared to 2,800 square feet for the "unincorporated" control group. The unincorporated area homes also tend to be about five years newer than those within San Diego City.
Housing attributes are shown to vary significantly depending on their location along the city border. Descriptive statistics for the housing sales data by region are included in Table 4 . The descriptive statistics illustrate general trends in the data; for example, homes sold in the northern regions tend to be newer, bigger, more expensive, and are more likely to have a pool compared to the southern regions. The heterogeneity of homes along the city border confirms the need for geographical controls within the model.
B. Model and Methods
I employ fixed effects for both the timing of the home sale and the border partitions along the city border. These fixed effects allow the model to account for time and geographical differences in the housing market. In some of the model specifications, I include the interactions of time and region dummy variables in order to control for differential time trends in local housing markets. Note: The statistics given are the means for these data subsets except for standard deviations which are denoted by parentheses and medians which are denoted by square brackets.
I assume the natural logarithm of the individual sales price is a linear function of housing characteristics, time, and location. Each of the regression equations takes the form
where X it are physical housing characteristics and controls for the location and timing of the sale of house i sold during time t, SD i is a dummy variable indicating whether house i is in San Diego City, and SD i *Post 2004 is the SD i variable interacted with Post 2004 which is a dummy variable indicating whether the time t of the home sale is in February 2004 or later. Table 5 shows the Lexis-Nexis counts of documents published from 1996 to 2010 in the community's leading newspaper, The San Diego Union-Tribune, that mention SDC-ERS and its underfunding and/or associated problems with the pension. The media's Note: The statistics given are the means for these data subsets except for standard deviations which are denoted by parentheses and medians which are denoted by square brackets.
increased coverage of the pension and its underfunding occurred in 2003. In 2004, the coverage began to mention the associated pension problems or refer to a pension crisis. These results are consistent with the public updating its negative expectations of the city's financial situation in late 2003 and the city's credit rating downgrades which began in February 2004. The coefficient on the interaction of interest, SD i *Post 2004 , provides an estimate of how the revelation of the pension crisis and associated events was capitalized in housing sales values within San Diego City, relative to a control group of homes just outside of San Diego City. A negative coefficient estimate can be interpreted as the amount by which housing prices within San Diego City along the city border fell upon hearing the news of the pension crisis relative to housing prices directly across the city border. This methodology is the difference-in-differences technique introduced by Ashenfelter and Card (1985) .
Four models are used for the principal analysis in this study. All four models use a boundary discontinuity design, in which the discontinuity compares the change in home prices on both sides of the San Diego City border; the analysis assumes that the legal responsibility for San Diego City unfunded pension liabilities belongs to the residents within the city limits. In base model (1), I incorporate physical housing characteristics as covariates, including the natural log of the square footage of the home, the natural log of the lot acreage, the number of bedrooms, the number of baths, whether the home is owner-occupied, whether the home has a pool, and dummy variables signifying time intervals when the home was built. Model (1) includes quarterly dummy variables for when the home was sold to control for macroeconomic effects over time and seasonality. The only control for the location of the home in this model is the San Diego City dummy variable.
Model (2) is identical to the base model, except for the inclusion of fixed effects for the border partitions. This follows the method introduced by Black (1999) , which segments boundaries to control for neighborhood effects in order to calculate the capitalization of higher test scores in home values. The border partition fixed effects and a boundary discontinuity design allow the model to identify and measure the impact of the news about the increased underfunding of pensions on housing prices while controlling for shared characteristics in small geographical areas on opposite sides of the city boundary. The proximity of the homes in each grouping used for comparison helps reduce the risk of omitted variable bias.
Otherwise identical to the second model, Model (3) interacts the region and quarterly dummy variables to allow for differential time effects in the local housing markets. This technique compares the treatment and control groups for the border partitions while allowing for housing sales trends in each region.
Model (4) is identical to the third model, except for the inclusion of the interaction of housing characteristics covariates with the region dummy variables. This allows for flexibility in the hedonic pricing model by allowing the value of housing characteristics to vary across regions, e.g., the value of an additional bathroom may differ by region.
I also estimate these four models with variations in the timing of the variables of interest. I include versions of the models where the variables of interest are the interactions of the San Diego City dummy variable and yearly dummy variables. For instance, including the interaction variables of interest for the years prior to 2004 allows testing of the identifying assumptions underlying the difference-in-differences model and documentation of the extent to which the event was really a shock.
In order to add model flexibility, I include a version of the models where annual price differentials are measured from 2000 to 2007. The public became informed about the pension in early 2004, but the city had earlier financial issues that motivated the change in pension policy that increased the allowed underfunding in 2002 as well as political scandals, directly or indirectly related to the pension problems, that were revealed over this time period. This more flexible model shows housing price differentials for the years before and after the general public began measuring San Diego City's financial problems by the level of the unfunded pension liabilities, as a result of the 2004 pension announcement events.
Placebo observations allow for an additional test whether the event of interest was indeed a shock. In order to accomplish this, the control group from the model above (home sales outside San Diego City within 0.25 miles of the border) becomes the placebo treatment group. The placebo control group contains homes outside San Diego City from 0.25 to 0.5 miles of the border. The coefficient of interest measuring a placebo treatment in this case should be insignificant.
I also estimate similar models with the dependent variable equal to the natural log of the number of home sales within each border partition. The coefficients of interest are interpreted as the percentage change in the housing sales volume within San Diego City during the period of interest relative to the area outside the city during the same time period. This supplementary analysis helps to provide context for interpreting the home price estimates in light of possible changes in the supply of housing. Residents may be more willing to sell their properties due to updated expectations of the city's financial problems or to hold on to properties in hopes that the negative impact on prices is only temporary following the announcement. The annual sales volumes within 0.25 miles of the San Diego City border are shown in Figure 5 . Notes: Robust standard errors given in parentheses are clustered by border partitions to allow for serial correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS
observable housing characteristics are included. These estimates have the expected signs. The coefficient for the number of bedrooms is negative in model (1) and positive and insignificant in models (2) and (3). When holding the square footage and lot size constant, an extra bedroom should take value away from the home. Models (2) and (3) use the border partition fixed effects where there is little variation in the number of bedrooms within each border partition, so the estimates are small and insignificant. The coefficients for homes in San Diego City are negative, but small and insignificant. The coefficient of interest, SD i *Post 2004 , ranges from -0.025 to -0.037 for the four models. Model (1) gives an average price difference of -0.036 for all homes within San Diego City after the pension crisis revelation compared to homes in the neighboring communities using no geographic controls along the city border. Model (2), with the border partition fixed effects, has an estimate of -0.037 and represents a comparison of treatment and control groups using the small, neighborhood geography designations. Model (3) interacts the region dummy variables with quarterly dummy variables and gives an estimate of -0.025. Model (4) adds more geographical flexibility in estimation and the estimate increases slightly in magnitude to -0.031. I cluster the standard errors by the border partition in order to allow for serial correlation in local neighborhood geographies. The standard error for the coefficient of interest decreases with increasing geographical controls and is smallest for model (4). More generally, I find an increase in the precision of the estimates for models (3) and (4) than for models (1) and (2).
The top of Table 7 shows the results for the same models except for the addition of the coefficients of interest for the year 2003 in order to test the difference-in-differences assumptions and whether 2004 was really a shock relative to prior periods. The coefficients for the variable of interest, SD i *y2003 t , range from -0.014 to 0.005 and are statistically insignificant. The public announcement of the pension crisis and the various credit rating downgrades occurred in early 2004, so it is assumed there would be no effect to be measured during the year before the announcement. The coefficients of interest for the post 2004 period are similar to those in Table 6 , but the estimate for model (2) is no longer significant at the 10 percent level.
The bottom of Table 7 gives the results when using placebo observations. The estimates of the placebo coefficient of interest for each of the models are negative and statistically insignificant. The estimates for models (3) and (4) are -0.004 and -0.008, respectively. These results support the choice of a boundary discontinuity design methodology and indicate that the negative impact of the pension announcement event was indeed greater for the homes located within San Diego City.
In Table 8 , the annual interaction variables of interest for the years 2000 to 2007 using model (4) are given for homes within 0.25 miles of the city border. These annual point estimates and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals are shown graphically in Figure 6 . A vertical line between 2003 and 2004 signifies the approximate time of the announcement of the pension crisis. The estimates trend downwards over time following the announcement. The years 2000-2004 mark a time of increasing financial problems for San Diego City and show a potential effect related to the public's expectations regarding, and the general concern for, the city's financial problems prior to 2004. The media coverage prior to 2003 was incomplete at best because it did not address Notes: Robust standard errors given in parentheses are clustered by border partitions to allow for serial correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. The top regression shows results of the regression from Table 6 with the inclusion of the SD X y2003 variable. The lower regression labeled "Placebo Observations" includes home sales outside San Diego City border and within 0.5 miles of the city border. The placebo treatment variable takes the value of 1 for homes within 0.25 miles of the border. Notes: Robust standard errors given in parentheses are clustered by border partition to allow for serial correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
the public pension (Table 5 ). After the announcement of the pension crisis in 2004, the public's perception of the city's financial position was more complete because it took into account unfunded pension liabilities. Regression results analyzing sales volumes are also included in Table 8 . The results show the sales volumes for homes within San Diego City fell relative to the control group after the 2004 announcement. The only coefficient of interest that is statistically significant corresponds to the post event period (from 2004-2007) . These results are consistent with movement along a fixed housing supply curve as assumed by many capitalization studies. However, these results and methodology do not preclude small shifts in the housing supply curve that may have occurred if home owners' beliefs about San Diego City's finances had been updated. 
V. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS
This section describes additional robustness tests. First, I consider choice of distance from the border used to limit the housing sales data for the regression models. Generally the closer the proximity to the city border, the more unobserved or unmeasured variables the treatment and control groups share in common and less risk of omitted variable bias. As a robustness test, I increase the subsets of home sales to include home sales within 0.5, 0.75, and 1 mile of the city border. Varying the distances from the border allows me to gauge the sensitivity of the results to the choice of distance to the city border given a terrain of hills, ravines, and other natural borders and the increasingly dissimilar neighborhood comparisons at greater distances.
To the extent spillovers are present, one might expect estimates to become more negative as properties less likely to be indirectly affected are included, absent omitted variables. The point estimates of the coefficients of interest for all four models at these distances from the San Diego City border are shown graphically in Figure 7 . The point Notes: The X-axis shows the distance in miles from the city border which determines the data used for estimation. The four model trends give the "San Diego X Post 2004 Event" point estimates for each of the four models. estimates appear the most consistent across all four models at the 0.25 miles distance. The magnitudes of the estimates for all models decrease as the distance from the border increases and the effect is actually reversed, giving positive estimates for models (1) and (2) at distances greater than 0.5. These results could be consistent with potential increases in omitted variables due to the comparison of homes that have more dissimilar neighborhood amenities. Models (3) and (4), which have more geographical controls, appear to be more robust to varying distances from the border. The regression results for model (4) at various distances from the border are presented in Table 9 . Only the estimates for 0.25 and 0.5 miles from the border are statistically significant and are equal to -0.031 and -0.024, respectively.
For an additional robustness test, I exclude extreme observations from the main models. I limit the data by first running probit regressions of the form
where the dependent variable, SD it , is the dummy variable indicating whether house i sold during time period t is in San Diego City and X it represents the same physical housing characteristics and controls as used in (1) above. Data are reduced to observations Notes: Model (4) includes the border partition dummy variables and the region dummy variables interacted with both the quarterly dummies and the other covariates. Robust standard errors given in parentheses are clustered by border partition to allow for serial correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
with predicted values between 0.1 and 0.9, excluding extreme observations. 20 Results are consistent with main results of this study. Another robustness test uses the natural log of the housing price index in place of the quarterly dummy variables to estimate the housing market trends. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) provides the San Diego MSA housing price index from the FHFA Four-Quarter Percent Change which is shown in Figures 1 and 2 . The housing price index is for the entire MSA which contains the homes along the San Diego City border. In contrast to the original model specification, data in this model specification estimate only the coefficient of interest and not the overall housing price trends. The modified regression is
where the model is the same as (1) above except X it no longer includes quarterly fixed effects, the inclusion of ln(HPI) t representing the general housing price trend, and the inclusion of Post 2004 measures the deviation in prices of included observations along the border from the general housing price trend following the pension crisis announcement.
The variable of interest is again SD i *Post 2004 and measures the percentage change in San Diego City home prices relative to the home prices of the control group following the announcement. The regression results when substituting the natural log of the housing price index for the quarterly fixed effects are shown in Table 10 . These point estimates range from -0.025 to -0.036. Only the coefficient of interest for model (4) is statistically significant and the point estimate is -0.029. These results are similar in direction and magnitude to the results in Table 6 . This helps assuage concerns about using data in the original model specification to estimate both the housing price trends and the deviations from these trends.
The regression estimates for the log of the housing price index are 0.892 and 0.902 for Models (1) and (2), respectively. These estimates are elasticities and imply a one percent change in the general housing price index corresponds to a 0.9 percent change in the housing prices along the city border. The HPI for San Diego includes communities that do not border San Diego City, like San Marcos and Carlsbad. The negative estimate, -0.026 to -0.040, for the Post 2004 coefficient shows that home prices on both sides of the border were negatively impacted by the news of the pension crisis after controlling for the San Diego MSA home prices. This suggests a negative spillover effect impacting the control group relative to the overall San Diego MSA. The negative value for the coefficient of interest, SD i *Post 2004 , indicates the San Diego City homes prices were negatively impacted more severely than those of the control group; the overall housing price change of San Diego City homes along the border relative to the entire San Diego MSA ranges from -0.061 to -0.065.
The final analysis considers homes that are owner-occupied and those that are rental properties. Capitalization of public debt directly impacts current property owners through the reduction in housing values. This burden is then passed on to property tenants, but property owners are assumed to bear more of the burden and the impact is more immediate. Public debt capitalization has been shown to lead communities with a greater proportion of owner-occupants to prefer lower debt-to-tax ratios (Stadelmann and Eichenberger, 2012) . However, this study provides some insight into potential differences between the owner-occupied and rental property markets by measuring the impact for both of these markets separately. Housing characteristics and market tendencies may be different for homes that are owner-occupied and those that are not. Because renters generally have more mobility than home owners and California's Proposition 13 prohibits raising property taxes above one percent of the property's value, renters expecting decreased net services in San Diego City might be more inclined to migrate to neighboring communities. This potential migration of renters could suggest a relative decrease in the value of rental properties compared to the owner-occupied homes within San Diego City following the pension crisis news. Additionally, investment time frames may be shorter for rental property owners, which could also lead to a greater negative impact on the value of these properties.
The original model specification and main results shown in Table 6 , allow for a price difference in homes that are owner-occupied and homes that are not. The coefficients for owner-occupied homes range from 0.022 to 0.028, which implies that on average owner-occupied homes cost more than 2 percent more than homes that are not. These data, however, reflect an imperfect measure for the owner-occupied variable because they denote the current owner and not the previous owner or owners if the home has been sold multiple times. 21 The results presented in Table 11 are for the four models and the subpopulations of owner-occupied homes and homes that are not. Models (3) and (4) estimates are statistically significant and range from -0.021 to -0.024 for owner-occupied homes and -0.044 to -0.051 for homes that are not. Generally, a more pronounced capitalization in prices of homes may result from a relatively more inelastic supply of homes and the mobility of labor and capital (Eichenberger and Stadelmann, 2010) . 22 However, properties are easily converted between owner-occupied and rental properties within the same community. This supports the notion that the mobility of labor is the more dominant factor driving potential differences in these markets. The rental property market in San Diego City in this case appears to have been more negatively impacted by the news of the pension crisis than the owner-occupied housing market.
Analyzing the share of properties sold that are owner-occupied, I employ linear probability and probit models where the owner-occupied dependent variable is a function of housing characteristics, time, and location. The linear probability regression equations take the form
where the variables in the models are the same as the original model specification except the owner-occupied dummy variable and the former dependent variable, the natural 21 Properties may be likely to retain the same owner-occupied status across sales transactions if characteristics or locations appeal to a particular lifestyle or type of buyer, in which case it might be possible to draw some inference about the owner-occupied and non-owner-occupied housing markets. 22 Price impacts are greater when the supply curve is relatively more inelastic. Several factors in this event study support a large impact on housing prices. Hilber and Mayer (2009) show housing supply is relatively more inelastic in developed and urban areas where there are constraints to housing construction. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) show that housing price impacts are potentially greater for negative demand shocks because this section of the supply curve is more inelastic due to the durability of the housing stock. Particularly relevant for these results, owner-occupants may have more flexibility in determining when to sell their homes following the negative announcement. Notes: Robust standard errors given in parentheses are clustered by border partitions to allow for serial correlation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
logarithm of the individual sales price, have been interchanged. The marginal effect estimates of the probit model results show the non-linear difference-in-differences analogue to (4) (Puhani, 2012) . The results presented in Table 12 , while mostly statistically insignificant, show the share of owner-occupied homes sold in San Diego City may have increased by two to four percent relative to the control group following the announcement of the pension crisis. A tightening of the non-owner-occupied housing market would be consistent with the results of Table 11 where those market prices appear to have been more negatively impacted by the pension crisis news.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study shows housing markets are responsive to the perceived financial position of local governments. In particular, beginning in early 2004, news of San Diego City's disclosure of increased unfunded pension liabilities, the related whistle blowing event, credit downgrading, and subsequent financial and political issues, etc., led to a relative decrease of 2.5-3.7 percent in the city's housing prices along the city border. The mobile nature of renters may have led to a further relative decrease in prices of rental properties.
The capitalization of the news related to unfunded pension liabilities is measured using a boundary discontinuity design and a difference-in-differences estimate corresponding to the timing of the announcement of the pension crisis and the subsequent downgrades of the city's credit rating. The close proximity of the treatment and control groups helps avoid omitted variable bias.
In interpreting the magnitudes of the coefficients, it is important to realize that the boundary discontinuity approach identifies the relative change in the value of the net benefits. To the extent that there are spillovers in the provision of public goods to nonresidents, those on the other side of the city border received negative news as well. Despite this tendency for the estimates to reflect less than the full perceived change in net benefits for city residents, the estimates suggest an overcapitalization of the unfunded pension liabilities or public debt.
The dollar impact on housing prices of $8,153 to $12,066, measured by a 2.5 to 3.7 percent decrease on the overall median house price of $326,112, is greater than the $2,569 to $4,519 of unfunded pension liability per household, which represents the legal debt burden of each resident household. 23 The debt burden increases to $5,137 to $8,812 when the unfunded liabilities for retiree health care are included, which is still below the dollar impact on housing prices. 24 impact on housing prices and the actual public debt burden increases because the prior public knowledge of underfunding, based on the 1996 and 2002 pension policy changes, implies only a fraction of the legal debt burden would have been new information at the time of the 2004 "news announcement." Oates (1988) defines fiscal illusion as a systematic misperception of fiscal parameters. The overcapitalization resulting from the San Diego City pension crisis seems to provide an exaggerated response in the housing market. The unfunded liabilities in the periods before and after the announcement seem to be imperfectly internalized by residents in opposite directions.
One possibility is that the news of the pension crisis may have signaled more than the legal liabilities owed by residents. 25 Unfunded pension liabilities, by nature, are a form of revolving debt which requires discipline and the ability to prioritize community goals over time. Municipalities have some discretion over the rate of repayment, in addition to some actuarial assumptions. The unfunded liabilities may be amortized over 20 to 30 years or more in some cases. The annual required contribution to fund the pension in any given year may be too expensive relative to the city's annual budget, incentivizing further underfunding of the pension.
